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WHO’S THE BOSS? THE NEED FOR 
REGULATION OF THE TICKETING INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
To many music fans, the chance to see their favorite performers live is a 
rare and special experience. Given the infrequency of such events, 
consumers are often willing to spend large sums of money to obtain tickets 
to attend these shows. However, these consumers may be unaware that they 
are regularly being misled by the largely unregulated ticketing industry into 
overpaying for their tickets. 
On Monday, February 2, 2009, at 10 a.m., tickets to Bruce Springsteen 
and the E Street Band’s “Working on a Dream” tour1 went on sale to the 
public through Ticketmaster.com2 for the May 21, 2009 and May 23, 2009, 
shows at the Izod Center at the New Jersey Meadowlands, in East 
Rutherford, New Jersey.3 Because Springsteen hails from New Jersey,4 
“[h]undreds of thousands of local Springsteen fans were” seeking tickets to 
these shows.5 Within minutes of the commencement of the sale, consumers 
were met with error messages and were redirected6 to TicketsNow.com,7 a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Ticketmaster, Inc. (Ticketmaster) and the 
second largest secondary ticketer in the world.8 There, some tickets were 
sold at prices four times greater than their actual face value.9 This was done 
despite the fact that original tickets to the shows were still available on 
Ticketmaster.com.10 Instead of offering tickets at face value on its primary 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Daniel Kreps, Bruce Springsteen Announces “Working on a Dream” Tour, ROLLING 
STONE MUSIC (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/15765/91347 
(announcing a 26-show U.S. concert tour that followed the band’s late January 2009 release of 
their album Working on a Dream). 
 2. Ticketmaster is a leader in “e-commerce and ticketing sites online, operating in 18 global 
markets, and with 19 worldwide call centers.” About Ticketmaster, http://www.ticketmaster.com/ 
h/about_us.html?tm_link=tm_homeA_i_abouttm (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). “Ticketmaster has 
been connecting fans to live entertainment since 1976, and is a Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. 
company.” Id. 
 3. Peggy McGlone, Ticketmaster Reveals Details of Rapid Sales: There are 38,778 Tickets 
for Two N.J. Concerts by Bruce Springsteen. You’re Chances of Getting One? ABOUT ZERO, 
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 21, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter McGlone, Ticketmaster 
Springsteen Concert]. 
 4. DAVE MARSH, BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN: TWO HEARTS: THE DEFINITIVE BIOGRAPHY, 1972-
2003, at 278 (2004). 
 5. McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
 6. Id.; see also Ben Sisario, Ticketmaster Reaches Settlement on Complaints of Deceptive 
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.19, 2010, at B3 (describing the details of a settlement between the Federal 
Trade Commission and Ticketmaster stemming from complaints from “thousands of customers 
[that claimed that] Ticketmaster’s Web site . . . pointed [them] to TicketNow.com . . . [and] of-
fered similar tickets at inflated prices”). 
 7. Ticketmaster purchased TicketNow in January 2008 for $265 million. Jon Hood, 
TicketsNow Once Again in Hot Water, CONSUMER AFFAIRS (May 21, 2009), 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2009/05/ticketsnow.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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ticketing site, Ticketmaster blocked those primary sales and immediately 
sent consumers to its secondary ticketing Web site, TicketsNow.com, 
without warning, to purchase more expensive tickets.11 
Almost immediately, deceived consumers began filing complaints with 
the New Jersey Attorney General’s (Attorney General) Office and the New 
Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs.12 During the course of the 
investigation, Ticketmaster revealed that a software glitch was the official 
source of the problem.13 However, in response to an open letter posted by 
Springsteen to his fans on his Web site blaming Ticketmaster for the 
mishandling of his concert ticket sales,14 Ticketmaster CEO Irving Azoff 
acknowledged that in certain circumstances the company did intentionally 
direct consumers to TicketsNow.com.15 Ticketmaster and the Attorney 
General’s Office eventually reached a settlement in which the company 
agreed to provide for consumers who overpaid for their tickets and to 
change its business practices in order to better protect and inform its 
customers.16 
This incident is not an isolated occurrence, but exemplifies a much 
bigger problem in the largely unregulated ticketing industry.17 In both the 
primary18 and secondary19 ticketing markets, companies are engaging in 
predatory practices that adversely affect consumers.20 In the primary 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Press Release, New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, Attorney General 
Announces Settlement with Ticketmaster on Sale of Springsteen Tickets (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/press/brucefinal.htm [hereinafter N.J. AG Settlement Press Release]. 
 13. Ticketmaster Changes Sales Practices After Springsteen Flap, CBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2009), 
http://www.cbc.ca/consumer/story/2009/02/23/ticketmaster-settlement.html. 
 14. Bruce Springsteen Ticketmaster Controversy! Letters from the Boss, a Congressman & 
CEO + Live Nation, TicketsNow, BROOKLYN VEGAN (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:13 AM), 
http://www.brooklynvegan.com/archives/2009/02/bruce_springste_17.html. 
 15. Ray Waddell, Ticketmaster Responds to Springsteen, Fans, BILLBOARD.COM (Feb. 5, 
2009, 12:37 PM), http://www.billboard.com/bbcom/news/ticketmaster-responds-to-springsteen-
fans-1003938632.story#/bbcom/news/ticketmaster-responds-to-springsteen-fans-
1003938632.story. In Azoff’s defense, he stated that “‘[t]his redirection only occurred as a choice 
when we could not satisfy fans’ specific search request for primary ticket inventory.’” Id. 
 16. N.J. AG Settlement Press Release, supra note 12. The settlement terms included: a series 
of concessions towards consumers directly affected by the Springsteen ticket fiasco; “a wall 
between Ticketmaster and its ticket re-selling subsidiary TicketsNow.com for at least a year”; 
“approval from the [N.J.] Attorney General for any links between [Ticketmaster’s] ‘No Tickets 
Found’ Internet page to its TicketsNow re-sale website”; no “paid Internet search advertising that 
would lead consumers searching for ‘Ticketmaster’ on Internet search engines to its TicketsNow 
re-sale site”; a guarantee that all tickets “it receives for sale to the general public will be sold on its 
primary market website”; and no sale or offer of sale of “any tickets on the TicketsNow.com re-
selling website until the initial sale begins on its primary website.” Id. 
 17. See Hood, supra note 7 (indicating online ticket market problems for recent Hannah 
Montana and Phish shows). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 19. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 20. See Competition in the Ticketing and Promotion Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–7 (2009) 
(statement of N.J. Rep. Pascrell, Jr.). 
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ticketing market such predatory practices include diverting tickets to 
secondary ticket sellers,21 and having a limited, unknown number of tickets 
available for public sale,22 which are often the result of limited ticket pre-
sale events.23 In the secondary market, predatory practices include 
exorbitant markups on ticket prices,24 the sale of tickets before the initial 
primary ticket release,25 and the sale of “phantom tickets.”26 Regulation is 
necessary to combat these predatory practices, protect the consumer, and 
rectify the ills that currently exist. Representative Bill Pascrell, Jr.27 has 
proposed federal legislation; the Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and 
Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009 (the BOSS ACT, or the 
Act),28 which seeks to “overhaul the concert ticket industry and improve 
fans’ chances of scoring tickets to their favorite acts.”29 
This note explores the need for regulation of the primary and secondary 
ticketing markets and suggests that the passage of federal legislation is the 
solution. In light of the recent and repeated problems affecting the ticketing 
industry, and the prevalence of predatory practices adverse to consumer 
interests, congressional action is necessary. The BOSS ACT will protect 
consumers and rectify predatory practices throughout the primary and 
secondary ticketing markets; it will make the ticketing industry more 
reliable and transparent, and afford regular fans a fair chance to attend their 
favorite events. 
Part I of this note presents an overview of the ticketing industry as a 
largely unregulated trade consisting of distinct primary and secondary 
markets, and identifies the major players in each segment of the industry. 
Part II examines the predatory practices currently being employed and the 
adverse effect such practices are having on consumers. Part III analyzes the 
proposed BOSS ACT and the effect it could have on the industry, and 
advocates that Congress swiftly pass this legislation. Finally, Part IV 
proposes additional rules the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Hood, supra note 7. 
 22. See McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
 23. See Clark P. Kirkman, Note, WHO NEEDS TICKETS? Examining Problems in the 
Growing Online Ticket Resale Industry, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 739, 751 (2009) (describing the 
anger of parents who received no ticket purchasing privileges despite paying membership fees to 
have access to ticket presales). 
 24. See, e.g., Ethan Smith, Concert Tickets Get Set Aside, Marked Up by Artists, Managers, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at B1. 
 25. See, e.g., Editorial, Who Can Tame the Scalpers?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A20. 
 26. Id. (describing phantom tickets as the sale of tickets that do not exist).  
 27. Representative Pascrell, Jr. is a Democrat representing the 8th Congressional District of 
New Jersey. Biography of Bill Pascrell, Jr., HOUSE.GOV, http://pascrell.house.gov/news/ 
biography.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
 28. Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 29. Peggy McGlone, The BOSS ACT Rewrites Rules on Ticket Sales, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), June 1, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter McGlone, The BOSS ACT Rewrites]. 
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promulgate upon the passage of the BOSS ACT to facilitate the regulation 
of the ticketing industry. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE MARKETS FOR TICKETS 
The ticketing industry emerged out of necessity for commercial 
entertainment.30 According to several historians, “commercial entertainment 
began in sixteenth century England with the introduction of for-profit 
theatres.”31 At that time, theaters were divided into sections and consumers 
were charged incrementally differing amounts to access more exclusive 
sections.32 From what was once a simple ticketless process, ticketing has 
developed into a thriving, multi-billion dollar industry consisting of many 
buyers and many sellers in two distinct markets: the primary ticketing 
market and the secondary ticketing market.33 
A. PRIMARY TICKETING MARKET 
A ticket,34 which entitles the bearer the right to enter a particular event, 
is first sold in a primary sale35 in the primary market.36 To understand how 
the primary market works, consider the typical organization of a concert. A 
promoter will hire an act, book a venue, and all parties involved will 
negotiate a plan to divide potential profits.37 The promoter will generally set 
the ticket price and determine when the “advertising and selling” of the 
tickets should begin.38 The venue will make some tickets available “through 
the box office39 where the event will be held and the promoter (or the 
venue) [will] also contract[] with a ticketing agency,” such as Ticketmaster, 
to facilitate the majority of the ticket sales.40 Tickets issued by the venue are 
placed on the market, and the venue is considered the “primary ticket 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Pascal Courty, Some Economics of Ticket Resale, 17(2) J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 90 (2003). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 87–89. 
 34. “The term ‘ticket’ means a ticket of admission to a sporting event, theater, musical 
performance, or place of public amusement of any kind.” Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and 
Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009, H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. § 6(10) (2009). The 
definitions adopted throughout this note are the definitions utilized in the pending BOSS ACT 
legislation. 
 35. See Courty, supra note 30, at 87 (describing the general mechanics of a primary sale). 
Additionally, “[t]he term ‘primary sale,’ with regards to a ticket, means the initial sale of a ticket 
that has not been sold previous to such sale, by a primary ticket seller to the general public on or 
after the date advertised such sale.” H.R. 2669 § 6(7). 
 36. OFFICE OF N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., "WHY CAN'T I GET TICKETS?": REPORT ON TICKET 
DISTRIBUTION PRACTICES 16 (1999) [hereinafter SPITZER REPORT]. 
 37. Courty, supra note 30, at 87. 
 38. Id. 
 39. “The term ‘box office’ means a physical location where tickets are offered for primary 
sale.” H.R. 2669 § 6(3). 
 40. Courty, supra note 30, at 87. 
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seller”41 or “original ticket seller.”42 The “face value”43 of the ticket is 
printed on the ticket and is comprised of the “base price”44 as well as some 
of the “ancillary charges”45 the ticketing agency, and sometimes the box 
office, adds on.46 Despite the fact that ticketing agencies charge additional 
fees on top of the base price, most tickets are typically sold through them 
because agencies can reach a significantly larger audience than the box 
office.47 
Estimates of the total value of tickets sold per year vary greatly. In 
2008, Ticketmaster sold nearly 142 million tickets valued at over $8.9 
billion.48 According to Forrester Research, the primary ticketing sales 
market in the U.S. for live music and sporting events approximates $22 
billion per year.49 Other studies, from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, 
“estimate[] [that the] total primary market tickets vary in range from $7 to 
$60 billion, with that range depending on the set of events” that were 
considered.50 Although Ticketmaster dominates the primary ticket market, 
                                                                                                                 
 41. H.R. 2669 § 6(8). 
The term ‘primary ticket seller’ means an owner or operator of a venue or a sports team, 
a manager or provider of an event, or a provider of ticketing services (or an agent of 
such owner, operator, manager, or provider) that engages in the primary sale of tickets 
for an event or retains the authority to otherwise distribute tickets. 
Id. 
 42. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 16. 
 43. “The term ‘face value’ means the total price of a ticket including both the base price and 
any ancillary charges.” H.R. 2669 § 6(6). 
 44. “The term ‘base price’ means the price charged for a ticket other than any ancillary 
charges.” Id. § 6(2). 
 45. “The term ‘ancillary charges’ means service fees, convenience charges, parking fees, and 
other charges associated with the purchase of a ticket and not included in the base price of the 
ticket.” Id. § 6(1). 
 46. Courty, supra note 30, at 87. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Press Release, Sen. Kohl, Kohl Urges Department of Justice to Closely Scrutinize 
Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger (July 27, 2009), http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease. 
cfm?customel_dataPageID_1464=2986. 
 49. Press Release, TicketNetwork.com, Ticket Resale Industry Protects Consumers With Fair 
Market Prices and Secure Transactions (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer 
Protection Press Release]. 
 50. Courty, supra note 30, at 87; Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, Creating A 
Futures Market for Major Event Tickets: Problems and Prospects, 21 CATO J. 443, 448–49 
(2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj21n3/cj21n3-6.pdf. 
Using data from U.S. Statistical Abstracts, Variety, Newsday, Amusement Business, 
Team Marketing Report, and the League of American Theaters and Productions, 
TicketAmerica (1998) derived an estimate of $7.2 billion spent through primary ticket 
channels in 1997. The Kelsey Group (1999) gives estimates and forecasts of total ticket 
sales from 1999 to 2004 as $14.5 billion, $16.25 billion, $18.1 billion, $19.9 billion, 
$21.9 billion, and $24.4 billion, respectively. LiquidSeats (2001) estimates the face 
value of all tickets sold in the United States for live events and attractions in 1999 to be 
$16.7 billion. In contrast, TickAuction.com (2000) finds the primary ticket market to be 
over $41 billion in 2002, and EventTixx finds the “Tier 1 Event Marketplace” (major 
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Live Nation,51 TeleCharge,52 and TicketWeb53 are other significant 
players.54 
B. SECONDARY TICKETING MARKET 
Once a ticket has been sold in the primary ticket market a ticket 
“resale” or “secondary sale”55 by a secondary ticket seller56 can occur in the 
secondary market.57 This process is generally referred to as “ticket 
                                                                                                                 
league sports, college football and basketball, concerts, Broadway theater, select golf 
and tennis tournaments, etc.) to have ticket sales in excess of $60 billion in 2000. 
Happell & Jennings, supra at 448–49. 
 51. Live Nation About Us, http://www.livenation.com/company/getCompanyInfo (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2010). 
Live Nation Entertainment (NYSE-LYV) is the largest live entertainment company in 
the world, consisting of five businesses: concert promotion and venue operations, 
sponsorship, ticketing solutions, e-commerce and artist management. Live Nation seeks 
to innovate and enhance the live entertainment experience for artists and fans: before, 
during and after the show.  
In 2009, Live Nation sold 140 million tickets, promoted 21,000 concerts, partnered with 
850 sponsors and averaged 25 million unique monthly users of its e-commerce sites. 
Id. 
  Merger talks between Live Nation and Ticketmaster became public in February 2009. See 
Ethan Smith, Ticketmaster, Live Nation Near Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb 4, 2009, at A1. The 
merger was completed in January 2010, after the Justice Department announced conditions that 
had to be met before they would accept the merger. Ben Sisario, Justice Dept. Clears Ticketmaster 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at B4. Both parties agreed to the conditions which included 
Ticketmaster selling off one of its ticketing divisions and licensing its software to a competitor, as 
well as 10 years of “tough antiretalitation provisions” to prevent monopolistic control of the 
industry. Id. 
 52. About Telecharge.com, http://www.telecharge.com/aboutUs.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 
2009) (describing Telecharge.com as the “official ticketing agency for most of New York City’s 
theatres” and as a division of The Shubert Organization Inc.). 
 53. About TicketWeb, http://event.ticketweb.com/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 21, 
2009). 
TicketWeb is a self-service online ticketing and event marketing application operated 
by Ticketmaster, the world’s leading ticketing company. The proprietary system allows 
venues and event providers of any size to manage the full range of box office operations 
on the Web, with the added value of integration and distribution through 
Ticketmaster.com. 
Id. 
 54. Press Release, Ticket News, Ticket News Announces Top Ticket Sellers for Week Ending 
October 10, 2009 (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.ticketnews.com/Ticket-News-Announces-Top-
Ticket-Sellers-for-Week-Ending-October-10-2009. 
 55. “The terms ‘resale’ or ‘secondary sale,’ with regards to a ticket, mean any sale of a ticket 
that occurs after the initial sale of the ticket.” Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and 
Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009, H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. § 6(9) (2009). 
 56. “The term ‘secondary ticket seller’ means a person engaged in reselling tickets for an event 
and who charges a premium in excess of the face value. Such term does not include an individual 
who resells fewer than 25 tickets during any 1-year period.” Id. § 6(12). 
 57. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 17. 
2010] Who's the Boss? 191 
scalping.”58 Institutional secondary ticket sellers are considered either ticket 
scalpers or ticket brokers.59 
Ticket scalpers first emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as unauthorized sellers of the unused portions of long-distance 
railroad tickets.60 Today, ticket speculators are more generally known as 
scalpers; a ticket speculator is “[a] person who buys tickets and then resells 
them for more than their face value; in slang, a [ticket] scalper.”61 Ticket 
scalping is broadly defined as the reselling of tickets to entertainment or 
sporting events at a price that is dictated by the marketplace.62 The more 
popular the event, the more likely it is that ticket scalping will occur and the 
higher the price at which the tickets will be sold.63 However, scalping, at 
face value or even for below face value, will often still occur when an event 
“is in low demand or not sold out.”64 
In contrast to ticket scalpers, ticket brokers are formal businesses that 
engage in the buying and selling of tickets.65 Ticket brokers have been 
around since the turn of the twentieth century, at which time they served as 
“remote sales outlets for theatres and ballparks,” where customers could 
purchase tickets without having to travel long distances.66 Today, 
companies such as Ticketmaster have replaced that primary ticketing 
function, relegating ticket brokers into the secondary ticketing market.67 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Jonathan C. Benitah, Note, Anti-Scalping Laws: Should They Be Forgotten?, 6 TEX. 
REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 55, 57 (2005). 
 59. See id. at 5759 (describing the history of ticket scalpers and ticket brokers).  
 60. See generally Burdick v. People, 36 N.E. 948 (Ill. 1894); Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552 (Ind. 
1878). The railroad would offer discounts on round trip tickets, so scalpers would purchase these 
“deals” and resell the unused portions to other customers. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Caffrey, 128 
F. 770, 77071 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1904). Soon thereafter, similar scalping enterprises sprang up with 
regards to theater tickets, in which “ticket speculators,” as they were known, would buy large 
batches of tickets from the box office and attempt to sell them outside of the venue above face 
value. See William O. Logan, Ticket Scalpers Arrested, THE BUFFALONIAN, 
http://www.buffalonian.com/history/articles/1851-1900/1899TICKETSCALPERS.html (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2010) (quoting Ticket Speculators, BUFFALO EXPRESS, Dec. 26, 1899). 
 61. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (8th ed. 2004). 
 62. Thomas A. Diamond, Ticket Scalping: A New Look at an Old Problem, 37 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 71, 71 (1982). 
 63. Jonathan Bell, Note, Ticket Scalping: Same Old Problem with a Brand New Twist, 18 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 435, 438 (2006). Additionally, the unique quality of each event makes tickets 
desirable whether the ticket price is high or low. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, 
The Folly of Anti-Scalping Laws, 15 CATO. J. 65, 66–67 (1995), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/journal/cj15n1-4.html. 
 64. Bell, supra note 63, at 438 n.16. 
 65. TicketLiquidator Glossary Page, TICKETLIQUIDATOR, http://www.ticketliquidator.com/ 
dictionary.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). 
 66. Scott D. Simon, Note, If You Can’t Beat ‘em, Join ‘em: Implications for New York’s 
Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket Business, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 
1172 (2004). 
 67. Id. at 1172–73. Furthermore, ticket brokers are typically small firms with only a few 
employees and $3-4 million in revenue per year. Happel & Jennings, supra note 50, at 449. For 
the purposes of this article, ticket scalping will be used to reference both ticket scalpers and ticket 
brokers. 
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The ticket scalping process typically begins with the purchase of tickets 
from the promoter, venue, or ticketing agency of the event, usually in bulk, 
and then waiting for the ticket supply to sell out.68 The scalper then offers 
the tickets to consumers at the marketplace price.69 This process of 
consumers purchasing tickets from the scalper, a secondary seller, rather 
than the venue or ticketing agency, the primary seller, creates the secondary 
market for tickets.70 
Ticket scalping is derived, in part, by the common practice of promoters 
selling tickets at below market prices.71 The rules of supply and demand 
justify this practice as lower prices will create a higher demand,72 resulting 
in more tickets sold, and the higher probability of a sellout, the promoters’ 
ultimate goal.73 This practice creates an ideal situation for ticket scalpers, 
but also for the average ticket holder who either cannot or no longer wants 
to attend the event.74 Because many consumers are willing to pay more than 
the advertised prices in the primary market for high demand tickets, 
scalpers can purchase premium tickets at face value and sell them to the 
highest bidder, confident that they will not be stuck with the tickets.75 
The Internet has revolutionized the ticketing industry. A process that 
once required going in person to purchase tickets or speaking with a 
ticketing agent on the phone can now be completed almost instantaneously, 
twenty-four hours a day, in the comfort of one’s own home.76 This has been 
especially beneficial to the secondary ticketing market.77 Scalpers may—
through the use of an “online resale marketplace,”78 such as StubHub,79 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Diamond, supra note 62, at 72. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Jasmin Yang, Note, A Whole Different Ballgame: Ticket Scalping Legislation and 
Behavioral Economics?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 111, 111 (2004). 
 71. Phyllis L. Zankel, Wanted: Tickets-A Reassessment of Current Ticket Scalping Legislation 
and the Controversy Surrounding Its Enforcement, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 129, 144 (1992). 
Promoters engage in this practice to promote good will among their followers, which they hope 
will yield greater long-term profits. Id. 
 72. Simon, supra note 66, at 1176. 
 73. See id. By pricing tickets below what the average consumer would spend for the ticket, the 
likelihood of shortage of tickets is increased. See id. 
 74. See id. The ticket scalper can step in as a middleman and purchase the tickets from the 
original ticket holder who no longer desires to attend above face value at a profit to that individual 
and then turn around and sell them at still a higher price to another consumer who desires entry 
into the event, creating a profit for both. Id. 
 75. See Robert E. Freeman & Daniel Gati, Internet Ticket Scalping: If You Can’t Beat ‘em, 
Join ‘em, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 6, 6 (2003). 
 76. See Benitah, supra note 58, at 74–75; see also Bruce Orwall, Online: Ticket Scalpers Find 
a Home on the Web, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1999, at B1. 
 77. See Kirkman, supra note 23, at 741. 
 78. “The term ‘online resale marketplace’ means an Internet website—(A) that facilitates or 
enables the resale of tickets by secondary ticket sellers; or (B) on which secondary ticket sellers 
offer tickets for resale.” Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert 
Ticketing Act of 2009, H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. § 6(11) (2009). 
 79. “StubHub is the world’s largest ticket resale marketplace, enabling fans to buy and sell 
tickets to tens of thousands of sports, concert, theater and other live entertainment events.” 
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eBay,80 Craigslist,81 RazorGator,82 and TicketsNow—be able to offer their 
inventory to the widest array of consumers and collect substantial returns.83 
The estimate of the value of tickets sold in the secondary market varies. 
While scalping was once an illicit, cash-only practice that took place 
outside of event venues, secondary ticket reselling over the Internet can 
provide a more readily analyzable source of industry activity data.84 
Forrester Research estimates that “U.S. online secondary ticket sales will 
grow at a 12% [rate] over the next five years, reaching $4.5 billion by 
2012.”85 Other sources indicate that the U.S. resale market is a $10 billion 
business, with online sales accounting for $3 billion per year, and rising.86 
Another figure cited estimates of secondary ticketing sales to be between $2 
and $14 billion.87 Regardless of the most precise number, the secondary 
market now comprises a substantial portion of the ticket industry. 
II. PREDATORY PRACTICES OF THE TICKETING INDUSTRY 
The primary and secondary ticketing markets have been actively 
working together for several years. The first time two major primary and 
secondary ticketing companies worked together to cross-promote and sell 
tickets was in 2007.88 By blurring the line between primary and secondary 
                                                                                                                 
StubHub is the Fan’s Ticket Marketplace, STUBHUB!, http://www.stubhub.com/about-us/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2010). StubHub was acquired by eBay in January 2007. eBay Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 10, 2007). 
 80. “With more than 90 million active users globally, eBay is the world's largest online 
marketplace, where practically anyone can buy and sell practically anything.” Who We Are— eBay 
Inc., http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). 
 81. Craigslist is a centralized network of online communities, featuring free online classified 
advertisements—with sections devoted to jobs, housing, personals, for sale, services, community, 
and discussion forums. See Craigslist Factsheet, CRAIGSLIST.ORG, http://www.craigslist.org/ 
about/factsheet (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
 82. RazorGator is a ticket resale marketplace that empowers its clients by providing them a 
connection to buy or sell “Hard-to-Get®” tickets to any event on the planet. RazorGator—About 
Us, http://www.razorgator.com/tickets/about-us (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
 83. See Kirkman, supra note 23, at 740 (describing industry returns of $3 billion in 2006). 
 84. See, e.g., Courty, supra note 30, at 88 (citing the total number of tickets available for sale, 
for a certain number of events, along with the auction prices, for a given day in August 2002 on 
eBay). 
 85. Consumer Protection Press Release, supra note 49. 
 86. Julie Gibson, Hot Tickets: The Move From Streetside Scalping to Online Ticket 
Speculation, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY (May 9, 2008), http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php? 
section=article&articleid=676. 
 87. Happel & Jennings, supra note 50, at 448–49 (citing estimates that made different 
assumptions as to the percentage of primary sale tickets brokers would resell in the secondary 
market). 
 88. Alfred Branch Jr., Tickets.com and RazorGator: Blurring the Lines Between Primary and 
Secondary, TICKETNEWS.COM (Jun. 26, 2007), http://www.ticketnews.com/Tickets.com-and-
RazorGator-Blurring-the-Lines-Between-Primary-and-Secondary27266. RazorGator and Major 
League Baseball’s Tickets.com used “Tickets.com customer database to promote events where 
Tickets.com [was] not the primary seller.” Id. Tickets.com decided to send a RazorGator 
newsletter to the Tickets.com customer database advertising an upcoming Dave Matthews Band 
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markets, primary ticket sellers are able to evade public scrutiny and appear 
to “distance themselves from the secondary market,” while maintaining 
significant control of that market.89 Although the outsourcing of tickets by 
primary ticketing companies to the secondary ticketing market may appear 
to be an innocent practice,90 such cooperation between the two ticketing 
markets fosters rampant predatory practices that deceive the public.91 
Predatory practices are widespread in both the primary and secondary 
ticketing markets. In the primary market, such practices include diverting 
tickets to secondary ticketing market sellers,92 having a limited, unknown 
number of tickets available for public sale,93 and ticket presale events that 
are available to only a select group of consumers thereby limiting the 
number of tickets available to the public at large.94 Predatory practices in 
the secondary market include the use of exorbitant ticket price markups,95 
the sale of tickets before the initial primary release,96 and the sale of 
“phantom tickets.”97 All of these practices adversely affect the consumers 
who are forced to pay higher prices for fewer available tickets, resulting in 
an economic loss to consumers.98 The predatory practices and their effect 
on consumers will be analyzed in turn. 
A. BAIT-AND-SWITCH: DIVERTING TICKETS TO AFFILIATED 
SECONDARY MARKET SELLERS 
Although the primary ticketing market is considerably larger than the 
secondary market in terms of the number of ticket sales and value of the 
industry as a whole,99 primary sellers face a limitation that does not affect 
their secondary market counterparts: primary ticketers are limited in what 
they may charge per ticket to the base value plus ancillary charges.100 In an 
                                                                                                                 
tour, in which Tickets.com was not the primary seller, and RazorGator was selling tickets only as 
a secondary seller. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (noting legitimate aspects of the cooperation between the primary and secondary 
markets, such as the reality that “‘it’s more profitable to outsource secondary marketing sales then 
[sic] do it internally’”). 
 91. See, e.g., Hood, supra note 7 (citing several examples of predatory practices when the 
primary and secondary ticket markets work together). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 24. 
 96. See, e.g., Who Can Tame the Scalpers?, supra note 25. 
 97. Id. Phantom tickets refer to the sale of tickets that do not exist, including sales for non-
existent sections. See id. 
 98. See Simon, supra note 66, at 1176–77 (discussing the economic transfer that occurs as a 
result of ticket purchaser’s willingness to pay higher amounts than charged by the box office, 
thereby allowing the “consumer surplus” to be transferred to secondary sellers). 
 99. See discussion supra Part I.A–B. 
 100. See Courty, supra note 30, at 87. Secondary ticket sellers face no such price limitation 
since they exist in a market of supply and demand in which the sale will occur at whatever price 
the market will bear. See Simon, supra note 66, at 1177. 
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effort to capitalize on marked-up prices, primary ticket sellers—particularly 
Ticketmaster101—who have close connections with secondary sellers, are 
engaging in a bait-and-switch practice with consumers.102 Often without the 
consumers’ knowledge, the primary sellers direct consumers to their 
affiliated secondary sellers to complete the transactions, thereby causing 
consumers to purchase tickets at higher prices than the face value offered 
directly by the primary seller.103 At other times, this bait-and-switch 
happens after face value tickets are no longer available, but still without a 
clear indication to the consumer that she has been redirected from a primary 
ticket seller to a secondary one.104 
While this practice came to light out of the Ticketmaster sale of Bruce 
Springsteen tickets for the “Working on a Dream” tour,105 it is hardly the 
only reported instance of such conduct. Allegations of bait-and-switch 
practices have also been claimed with ticket sales for Britney Spears,106 The 
Dead,107 Fleetwood Mac,108 Phish,109 and the Wizard of Oz Broadway 
performance.110 A class action lawsuit filed in the United States District 
Court in Trenton, N.J., states that consumers seeking tickets to the 
aforementioned shows as well as those for “Radiohead . . . Hannah 
Montana and numerous others” have been subjected to bait-and-switch 
practice by being redirected from Ticketmaster to its subsidiary resellers.111 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See supra Introduction and accompanying Bruce Springsteen discussion. 
 102. See, e.g., Hood, supra note 7. 
 103. Id. Such conduct is occurring even while tickets still exist through the primary ticket seller 
at face value. Id. 
 104. See Waddell, supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 105. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 106. On Jan. 25, 2009, purchaser bought Britney Spears tickets for $150 after Ticketmaster 
automatically redirected them to TicketsNow. Elise Young, Lawsuit Challenges Ticket Site’s 
Markups: Class-Action Filing Takes on Ticketmaster, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 7, 
2009, at 13. It was not until the tickets were delivered that purchaser realized the seats only had a 
face value of $30. Id. 
 107. Purchaser bought tickets to the April 22, 2009 concert of The Dead from TicketsNow, 
spending $348.50 without ever knowing that TicketsNow was a ticket reseller, or how 
TicketsNow obtained her credit card information that she had saved into her Ticketmaster 
account. Peggy McGlone, More Music Fans Claim Scalpings by Ticketmaster, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Feb. 9, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter McGlone, Scalping by Ticketmaster]. 
 108. Purchaser bought two tickets to the March 21, 2009 Fleetwood Mac concert for $606.50 
from what they thought was Ticketmaster. Id. However, the transaction was processed through 
TicketsNow only hours after the tickets went on sale, with “thousands of unsold tickets to the 
Fleetwood Mac show” still available at their face value. Id. 
 109. A lawsuit was filed in Federal Court in Massachusetts claiming that when a purchaser 
logged in to Ticketmaster seeking tickets to a Phish show, he was immediately told tickets were 
sold out and “immediately rerouted to TicketsNow,” where he bought nine tickets for $2,064, 
although the face value was only $60 per ticket. Hood, supra note 7. 
 110. On Feb. 18, 2009, purchaser bought four “Wizard of Oz” performance tickets for about 
$65 each, when the face value was only $35, after being automatically redirected from 
Ticketmaster to TicketsNow. Young, supra note 106. 
 111. Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 10, Vining v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 
09-cv-02096 (D. N.J. filed May 5, 2009), 2009 WL 1344722. 
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There have been additional reports of the same tactics being used for 
AC/DC and 3 Doors Down shows.112 Such predatory conduct extends to 
sales outside the United States as well.113 
Although many consumers may have been unaware that they were 
deceived until reports surfaced regarding the Bruce Springsteen show, ticket 
diversion adversely affects consumer interests.114 Consumers are directed to 
a secondary ticket seller without warning.115 This leads them to believe they 
are paying the face value of tickets when, in fact, they are paying much 
higher prices that are dictated by the marketplace, rather than the show’s 
management.116 Consumers are therefore purchasing tickets from secondary 
sellers at marked-up prices, even while face value tickets remain available 
from primary sellers.117 
The settlement reached in February 2009 between Ticketmaster and the 
Attorney General’s Office resulting from the Bruce Springsteen 
investigation sought to remedy this practice, in addition to compensating 
the aggrieved parties;118 however, further regulation is needed. Diversionary 
redirection is detrimental to consumers who are tricked into purchasing 
tickets in the secondary market,119 while primary ticket sellers who are 
affiliated with these secondary market sellers collect consumer surplus.120 
B. UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TICKETS AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC SALE 
The number of tickets that will be available for public sale depends on 
several factors. The size of the venue will determine the maximum number 
                                                                                                                 
 112. McGlone, Scalping by Ticketmaster, supra note 107. 
 113. Ticketmaster Changes Sales Practices After Springsteen Flap, supra note 13. In Canada, a 
class action lawsuit was filed against Ticketmaster resulting from a purchaser attempting to buy 
Toby Keith tickets for the Oct. 8, 2008 performance at the Rexall Place in Edmonton, Alberta. 
Press Release, Sutts, Strosberg LLP, Class Action Lawsuit Commenced in Alberta Against 
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., Ticketmaster Canada Ltd., TNOW Entertainment Group, Inc. 
and Premium Inventory, Inc. (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/ 
February2009/23/c3133.html. After accessing Ticketmaster Canada’s Web site, the purchaser was 
automatically redirected to TicketsNow, where she purchased one ticket for $219.15 and was 
never told the face value of the ticket before the transaction was completed. Id. When she received 
her ticket, she discovered the face value of the ticket was only $79.95. Id. 
 114. See McGlone, Scalping by Ticketmaster, supra note 107. 
 115. See, e.g., id. (noting that this automatic redirection misleads consumers to believe they are 
buying from the primary seller, when they are actually purchasing tickets in the secondary 
market). 
 116. See, e.g., id. 
 117. See id. (describing how thousands of unsold tickets, both better and cheaper, to the 
Fleetwood Mac show were still available at time of purchaser’s purchase from TicketsNow); 
Hood, supra note 7 (describing how tickets were still available for purchase to the Bruce 
Springsteen shows on Ticketmaster when consumers were directed to TicketsNow to purchase 
tickets in the secondary market). 
 118. N.J. AG Settlement Press Release, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Hood, supra note 7. 
 120. See Simon, supra note 66, at 1202 (discussing a 20% markup that is collected in large part 
by secondary market sellers). 
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of tickets that could be made available for sale.121 However, most 
consumers are unaware that the “house” holds back many of those 
potentially available tickets.122 Furthermore, instead of returning unused 
house tickets to public sale, these tickets often find their way to the scalpers 
and ticket brokers who sell them in the secondary ticket market.123 
Moreover, tickets that are held for performers and managers are often sold 
directly by them in the secondary market to consumers.124 An additional 
subset of tickets is sold through various pre-sale events, such as fan clubs 
and other groups, further limiting the number of tickets available for public 
sale.125 With such practices largely unknown to the public, consumers often 
have unrealistic expectations of their chances of obtaining their desired 
tickets through a general public sale.126 
The two Bruce Springsteen shows at the center of the Ticketmaster 
controversy demonstrate the false perceptions eager fans may have 
regarding their chances of getting tickets to a show. The total capacity for 
both shows was 38,778; however, only 28,284 tickets were made available 
for public sale—a little more than 14,000 per show.127 Tickets were held 
back for a variety of groups that included the media, the sponsors, the 
record label, and the band, among others.128 “In total, about 5,200 seats 
were excluded from the Ticketmaster sale for each show.”129 Had the public 
been made aware of the number of tickets being withheld, perhaps 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
 122. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 5. The house consists of “the producer, the promoter, 
the record company, the performer or other such individuals.” Id. 
 123. Id. at 42. 
 124. Smith, supra note 24. 
 125. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 46–47. 
 126. See id. at 5. 
 127. McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
 128. Id. 
The Izod Center held back more than 1,600 tickets for each concert for sponsors, media 
members and prospective sponsors, arena suite owners and the disabled. In addition, 
1,098 tickets were held back because of technical demands: the size of the stage and its 
exact sound and lighting equipment hadn’t been decided before the sale, so the tour 
kept back seats that may have limited sightlines. 
Just under 2,000 tickets for each concert—almost 10 percent—were held back for 
Springsteen and the [New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority], which sponsored 
the show. . .  
. . . 
An additional 550 tickets for each show were reserved for the band’s record label, 
Sony, and the booking agent, Creative Arts Agency. 
Id. 
 129. Id. For an exact breakdown of tickets sold to the May 21, 2009 and May 23, 2009 shows 
and to see what happened to the withheld tickets, see links provided in Peggy McGlone, Getting 
Into a N.J. Bruce Springsteen Concert is Harder Than Imagined, NJ.COM (May 20, 2009, 9:40 
PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/getting_into_a_nj_bruce_spring.html. 
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customers could have appropriately adjusted their expectations of obtaining 
tickets.130 
A large number of tickets are often held back by the house.131 
Generally, house seats that are not sold or used within forty-eight hours of 
the show are supposed to be returned to the box office for public sale.132 
However, experienced box office employees who have become familiar 
with this release schedule often sell these premium seats to ticket brokers 
just before the scheduled release,133 resulting in a loss to the general 
consumer of a chance to purchase the best seats at face value.134 Ticketing 
employees also take tickets that are intended for public sale “out of the 
system just prior to public sale,” decreasing the public’s allotment, and 
instead sell those tickets to secondary market outlets.135 Improperly 
regulated and supervised, house tickets often feed directly into the 
secondary ticketing market. 
Tickets that have been withheld from public sale frequently make their 
way into the secondary market through the conduct of performers and 
management themselves. Although most consumers believe the primary 
sellers in the secondary market are ticket brokers or fans who are unable to 
use their tickets, the premium tickets offered for sale on Ticketmaster’s 
TicketExchange136 are not being sold by typical fans, but by the artists 
themselves.137 In fact, the transactions that occur in the TicketExchange 
                                                                                                                 
 130. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 5. 
 131. Id. These “tickets are almost always the best seats in the house,” further depriving the 
public of a fair chance for the quality seats. Id. The sheer number of tickets withheld from public 
sale creates the opportunity for manipulation and abuse. See id. The release of house seats is 
actually on a “time-release” schedule such that some tickets “are released 72 hours before the 
performance, 48 hours before the performance, and 24 hours before the performance,” with some 
tickets held for last minute emergencies and VIPs. Id. at 43 n.46. 
 132. Id. at 43. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 5. Between April 1994 and July 1994, almost 1,000 house seats for the “Beauty 
and the Beast” and “Grease” shows were sold to ticket brokers just before their scheduled release 
for public sale. Id. at 43–44. 
 135. Id. at 45. For six concerts held at Madison Square Garden in 1998, 452 seats that were 
supposed to be designated for public sale were withheld last minute in a “management hold 
status,” and sold at the box office by box office employees. Id. Engaging in a similar scheme, for 
the Hootie and the Blowfish shows at Jones Beach Marine Theater in 1996, the box office 
treasurer and assistant treasurer withheld tickets valued at $300,000 to the first ten rows for 37 
shows, selling them to ticket brokers instead. Id. at 46. Consequently, the treasurer pled guilty to a 
series of felony charges. Id. 
 136. TicketExchange is Ticketmaster’s online service that supposedly enables “fan-to-fan 
transactions,” by serving as the middleman between buyer and seller, authenticating tickets when 
fans are connected to Ticketmaster’s ticketing systems. About TicketExchange, 
http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/te/about.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 137. Smith, supra note 24. In an effort to recapture the profits lost when tickets are sold by 
ticket brokers, Ticketmaster works with artists and managers to list “hundreds of the best tickets 
per concert” with its affiliated secondary sellers and divides the extra revenue, “which can amount 
to more than $2 million on a major tour,” with artists and management. Id. Ticketmaster CEO 
Azoff argued “that when ticket brokers resell tickets without permission from artists or promoters, 
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“Marketplace” pages rarely list tickets offered by fans, and whenever 
Ticketmaster lists so-called “platinum seats,” the marketplace is selling 
only artist-sanctioned seats.138 Reports claim that almost every major 
concert tour today involves the sale of withheld tickets being sold by artists 
and promoters in the secondary market.139 Professional sports teams have 
been selling their own tickets in the secondary market as well.140 Because 
artists and management profit from the secondary market, ticket brokers 
should not take all of the blame; regulation is needed to limit and protect all 
parties involved. 
The sale of tickets to the public is further limited by the existence of 
various presales such as those for fan clubs and certain credit card 
holders.141 However, even these fan club members have also been the 
victims of predatory practices of the ticketing industry.142 The existence of 
these presales can severely limit the number of tickets available for public 
sale, further distorting the public’s perception of total ticket availability.143 
The predatory practice of very limited disclosure regarding the number 
of tickets available for public sale for any given event impairs the general 
consumer by diverting a large number of tickets away from public sale and 
creating an unrealistic expectation of her chance of acquiring her desired 
ticket.144 Should more information be made available—as regulation of the 
                                                                                                                 
it ‘drives up prices to fans, without putting any money in the pockets of artists or rights holders.’” 
Id. 
 138. Id. Tickets for a Britney Spears concert in March 2009 had a link from Ticketmaster to 
TicketExchange accompanied by the message “[b]rowse premium seats plus tickets posted by 
fans.” Id. However, after inquiry by The Wall Street Journal, the “tickets posted by fans” part of 
the message was removed. Id. 
 139. Id. (listing as examples recent tours by Bon Jovi, Celine Dion, Van Halen and Billy Joel). 
 140. See, e.g., Benitah, supra note 58, at 75–77. For example, the Chicago Cubs set up a ticket 
brokerage called Wrigley Field Premium Ticket Services and the Seattle Mariners established the 
Ticket Marketplace to serve as a middleman between buyers and sellers and collect a commission 
for completed transactions. Id. at 75. 
 141. Event presales refer to special offerings of tickets available to select groups before the 
tickets are made available for public sale. TicketLiquidator Glossary Page, supra note 65. Fan 
clubs provide unrivaled access to their favorite artists and often club members are able to secure 
tickets to an event before those tickets are made available to the public by virtue of their 
participation, often a paid subscription, to the fan club. See Hood, supra note 7 (describing a 
Hannah Montana fan club). Additionally, presales often occur as a bonus for being a member of a 
certain group. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 41 (describing special ticketing benefits 
available to a member of a theater party or of a large group); Ellen Rosen, In the Race to Buy 
Concert Tickets, Fans Keep Losing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at C6 (discussing ticket purchasing 
advantages provided for being an American Express or Visa card holder). 
 142. Hood, supra note 7. A Hannah Montana—the persona of child star Miley Cyrus—Web site 
offered $30 memberships to its fan club that included early access to concert tickets; however, the 
“website failed to inform club members that the sales went public within fifteen minutes of first 
being offered to members.” Id. Additionally, the site offered early access “pre-sale codes” after 
the shows had already been sold out. Id. 
 143. Rosen, supra note 141. Of 11,000 seats available for a Hannah Montana concert, 
Ticketmaster was allocated 8,400 tickets by the promoter, with half going to the fan club and the 
other half going to the general public. Id. 
 144. See McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
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industry would require—the consumer would be better equipped to assess 
her chance of acquiring tickets; she would also better understand that 
additional tickets may be made available closer to show time,145 and could 
therefore avoid overpaying for tickets in the secondary market. 
C. EXORBITANT MARKUPS 
In the secondary market, the marketplace often dictates ticket resale 
prices.146 However, the price of tickets in the secondary market is also 
distorted by the below-market price maintained in the primary market147 as 
well as the excessive mark-ups that some ticket resellers add to the ticket 
price.148 One primary reason for this large mark-up is that ticket resellers 
often have to recover the costs of illegal payments that are used to acquire 
the tickets.149 
This practice, known as “‘ice’ is money paid, in the form of a gratuity, 
premium or bribe, in excess of the printed box office price of a ticket, to an 
operator of any ‘place of entertainment’ or their agent, representative or 
employee” for withholding the best seats from the public.150 By selling 
tickets at below the market-clearing price, the primary market participants 
enable this illegal practice because brokers and other individuals are willing 
to bribe the ticketing agents knowing they will be able to recoup their costs 
in the secondary market.151 Thus, the predatory practice of marking-up 
tickets to exorbitant prices that often occurs in the secondary market is the 
direct result of the illegal—and often clandestine—relationship between 
ticket resellers and ticket agents through which the secondary market sellers 
acquire their tickets.152 Regulation of this practice is necessary to protect 
consumers from excessive prices and rectify the illegal ticket exchanges 
that exist between ticket agents and secondary sellers. 
                                                                                                                 
 145. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 56–57. 
 146. See Diamond, supra note 62, at 73. 
 147. See Benitah, supra note 58, at 71–72; see also discussion supra Part I.B. 
 148. See Kirkman, supra note 23, at 746 (describing the common practice employed by 
promoters where they charge lower face value rates because of the awareness that extra fees will 
be generated through the secondary market). For example, an average seat to a Broadway musical 
in New York City during the 1990s costing $75 or $80 would be sold for between $100 and $175 
and sometimes more. See SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 14. 
 149. See Simon, supra note 66, at 1180. 
 150. Andrew Kandel & Elizabeth Block, The “De-Icing” of Ticket Prices: A Proposal 
Addressing the Problem of Commercial Bribery in the New York Ticket Industry, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 
489, 489–90 (1997). 
 151. Simon, supra note 66, at 1180. 
 152. See SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 19 (concluding that “one of the primary reasons for 
the inflated prices on the resale market is that certain brokers have to cover the cost of payments 
of ice”). 
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D. SECONDARY SALE OF TICKETS AT OR BEFORE INITIAL PRIMARY 
TICKET RELEASE 
Typically, a show’s promoter determines when the sale of tickets is to 
begin.153 However, since the Internet has taken over the secondary 
market,154 ticket resellers often engage in the predatory practice of listing 
tickets for sale before or at roughly the same moment of the primary 
market’s initial ticket release.155 Because secondary retailers should not 
have the actual tickets before the original sale, some consumers believe the 
system constitutes a scam.156 
The 2007 Hannah Montana “Best of Both Worlds Tour,” is illustrative 
of this systemic problem. Tickets to this fifty-four-date, nationwide concert 
tour went on sale at 10 a.m., and were sold out by 10:05 a.m.157 However, 
by 10:05 a.m. several secondary ticketing sites already had many tickets 
available, but at much higher prices.158 Similarly, tickets for the final Bruce 
Springsteen shows at Giants Stadium for September 30, 2009 and October 2 
and 3, 2009—officially priced between $33 to $98159—appeared on Web 
sites such as ebay.com, cheaptickets.com,160 and selectaticket.com161 up to a 
week before the official ticket release,162 with prices up to $1,300 a ticket.163 
The same phenomenon plagued the 2007 reunion tours of The Police and 
Van Halen.164 
The sale of tickets in the secondary market before or at the same time as 
an original ticket release is a predatory practice that hurts the consumer. It 
limits the number of consumers who are able to purchase tickets in the 
primary market,165 and is indicative of the dubious means by which 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Courty, supra note 30, at 87. 
 154. See Kirkman, supra note 23, at 741. 
 155. See id. at 750. 
 156. See Peggy McGlone, ‘Banned’ Ticket Sale Practice Persists: Jacked-up Prices for the 
Boss’ Shows, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 27, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter McGlone, Jacked-up 
Prices for the Boss’ Shows]. Certain consumers are convinced that secondary brokers are either 
promised tickets beforehand, purchase tickets from individuals who had access to an event 
presale, or engage in other dubious conduct to acquire tickets. Id. 
 157. Randall Stross, Hannah Montana Tickets on Sale! Oops, They’re Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2007, at 34. 
 158. Id. Tickets that had a face value of between $21 and $66 were listed almost 
instantaneously on Web sites like StubHub, for many times the face value. See id. 
 159. McGlone, Jacked-up Prices for the Boss’ Shows, supra note 156. 
 160. CheapTickets.com is a secondary market ticket reseller affiliated with Orbitz.com. About 
Orbitz Worldwide, http://corp.orbitz.com/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). “Orbitz Worldwide is a 
leading global online travel company that uses innovative technology to enable leisure and 
business travelers to research, plan and book a broad range of travel products.” Id. 
 161. Select-A-Ticket is a New Jersey ticket broker that has been buying and selling tickets to 
and from customers for over 30 years. About Select-A-Ticket, http://www.selectaticket.com/ 
About-Us (last visited July 28, 2010). 
 162. McGlone, Jacked-up Prices for the Boss’ Shows, supra note 156. 
 163. Who Can Tame the Scalpers?, supra note 25. 
 164. Rosen, supra note 141. 
 165. See id. 
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secondary sellers obtain their tickets through illegal practices.166 Increased 
regulation is necessary not only to prevent the secondary sale of tickets 
before the primary ticket release and to prevent secondary sellers from 
obtaining the tickets before the original sale, but also to maximize the 
number of tickets in the primary market and thereby increase the chances 
for regular consumers to obtain them.167 
E. SALE OF “PHANTOM TICKETS” 
Another practice plaguing the secondary market is the sale of tickets 
that do not actually exist.168 In yet another Bruce Springsteen tour ticketing 
gaffe, TicketsNow oversold the May 18, 2009 Washington D.C. show by 
selling “phantom tickets”169 to several hundreds of consumers.170 This 
practice has been called “plain fraud” by New Jersey Attorney General 
Anne Milgram,171 and despite the efforts to rectify the problem for those 
300 consumers who purchased the phantom tickets, regulation is required to 
prevent similar occurrences in the future.172 Greater transparency is 
necessary so that such frauds may be spotted more easily by consumers 
who can then find legitimate sources for tickets. 
III. PROPOSED REGULATION OF THE TICKETING INDUSTRY 
In response to the predatory practices currently plaguing the primary 
and secondary ticket markets, the federal government has taken the first 
steps towards rectifying this largely unregulated industry. On June 2, 2009, 
Representative Bill Pascrell, Jr. introduced a bill in the House of 
Representatives—the Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and 
Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009173—“to direct the Federal 
Trade Commission [FTC] to prescribe rules to protect consumers from 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with primary and 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See, e.g., Kandel & Block, supra note 150, at 489–90 (discussing secondary ticket brokers 
obtaining tickets through illegal payments to ticketing agents). 
 167. See McGlone, Jacked-up Prices for the Boss’ Shows, supra note 156; see also SPITZER 
REPORT, supra note 36, at 56 (“Any amendment to the current law should control the supply of 
tickets in the secondary or resale market.”). 
 168. See Hood, supra note 7. 
 169. Who Can Tame the Scalpers?, supra note 25. Phantom tickets refer to the sale of tickets 
that do not exist, including sales for non-existent sections. See id. 
 170. Mark Mueller, Ticketmaster Takes Heat For Another Springsteen Snag: Pascrell Promises 
a New Law After Finding Subsidiary Sold Nonexistent Tickets, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
May 14, 2009, at 13. 
 171. Peggy McGlone, AG Sues Resellers on Boss Tickets They Don't Have, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), May 28, 2009, at 1. 
 172. Hood, supra note 7. 
 173. The title of the bill is in reference to Bruce Springsteen, whose shows were at the center of 
the ticketing controversy described throughout this note. McGlone, The BOSS ACT Rewrites, 
supra note 29. 
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secondary ticket sales.”174 The bill is currently stalled in the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, where it has been referred.175 
However, the BOSS ACT effectively combats many of the deceptive 
practices in the industry and its immediate passage is necessary to protect 
consumers. The Act is substantively divided into four sections: 1) Rules on 
Transparency of Ticket Marketing, Distribution, and Pricing by Primary 
Ticket Sellers; 2) Rules for Secondary Ticket Sellers; 3) Registration of 
Secondary Ticket Sellers and Online Retail Marketplaces; and 4) 
Enforcement.176 Each of these sections will be analyzed. 
A. RULES ON TRANSPARENCY OF TICKET MARKETING, 
DISTRIBUTION, AND PRICING BY PRIMARY TICKET SELLERS 
With regard to the primary sale, distribution, and pricing of tickets, the 
BOSS ACT instructs the FTC to promulgate rules that require the 
disclosure of general information to the public before tickets go on sale.177 
First, the Act requires primary sellers disclose the total number of tickets 
that a seller has available for public sale.178 Next, primary sellers must 
disclose the “total number and the distribution method of all tickets” that 
are not available for public sale.179 Additionally, the Act requires the 
“distribution method and the date and time of the primary sale be printed on 
each such ticket.”180 Furthermore, the Act calls for primary sellers to list, in 
addition to the total cost, all of the ancillary charges associated with the 
ticket in all advertising or ticket listings.181 Finally, the Act mandates that a 
ticket refund include all ancillary charges.182 
The BOSS ACT requires primary sellers to disclose the total number of 
tickets they will have available for primary sale for each show or event.183 
This provision combats the well-documented predatory practice of 
withholding the number of tickets that are actually available for public 
sale.184 While consumers attempting to obtain tickets to performances and 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill is co-sponsored by 17 other representatives. H.R. 2669 
Cosponsors, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR026 
69:@@@P (last visited July 10, 2010). 
 175. H.R. 2669 CRS Summary, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ 
bdquery/z?d111:HR02669:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited July 10, 2010). 
 176. H.R. 2669. 
 177. Id. § 2. 
 178. Id. § 2(1). 
 179. Id. § 2(2). 
 180. Id. § 2(3). 
 181. Id. § 2(4). 
 182. Id. § 2(5). 
 183. Id. § 2(1) (including “[a] requirement that a primary ticket seller disclose and display on 
the Web site of such primary ticket seller the total number of tickets offered for sale by such 
primary ticket seller not less than 7 days before the date on which tickets shall be available for 
primary sale”). 
 184. See SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 5. 
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events frequently understand that not every ticket is available for public 
sale, they often do not know whether it is 500 tickets being withheld or 
5,000.185 Accordingly, consumers are unable to develop appropriate 
expectations with regard to their chances of acquiring tickets.186 By 
mandating the release of this information to the public, the BOSS ACT will 
help consumers to accurately assess their chances of getting tickets, thus 
rectifying a deceptive practice and major source of malcontent among 
consumers. 
This legislation also requires primary ticket sellers to make known the 
number of tickets and method of distribution for tickets they are responsible 
for that are not available for general sale.187 The disclosure of this 
information to the public will serve two main functions. First, in 
conjunction with the disclosure of the number of tickets that are available 
for public sale, consumers will be better equipped to have realistic 
expectations with regard to their ability to obtain tickets.188 Second, 
consumers who particularly desire tickets to a given show will be aware of 
presale events available only to certain groups of people and may be 
afforded the opportunity to join these groups in anticipation of the 
presales.189 The ultimate effect will provide greater transparency so 
members of the public who covet tickets can more effectively strategize and 
navigate the market than they can under the current system. 
The BOSS ACT will require that the “distribution method . . . and date 
and time of the primary sale be printed on each [] ticket.”190 This will 
combat several predatory practices. First, it will deter primary ticket sellers 
from diverting tickets to their wholly owned subsidiaries, as the source of 
the tickets will be more easily discernable.191 Second, it will diminish the 
sale of tickets in the secondary market before the primary ticket sale 
because it will make it more obvious when tickets were obtained through 
illicit means.192 Finally, the existence of these identification marks on the 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See McGlone, Ticketmaster Springsteen Concert, supra note 3. 
 186. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 5. 
 187. H.R. 2669 § 2(2). The bill has: 
A requirement that a primary ticket seller make publicly available, not less than 7 days 
before the day on which tickets shall be available for primary sale, the total number and 
distribution method of all tickets not made available for sale to the general public, the 
distribution of which is the responsibility of that primary ticket seller. 
Id. 
 188. See Rosen, supra note 141. 
 189. See TicketLiquidator Glossary Page, supra note 65. 
 190. H.R. 2669 § 2(3). 
 191. See Hood, supra note 7 (requiring tickets to contain the distribution method and the date 
and time will deter primary sellers like Ticketmaster because any improper transfer to secondary 
sellers will be transparent to consumers when they receive their tickets). 
 192. Id.; see also McGlone, Jacked-up Prices for the Boss’ Shows, supra note 156 (discussing 
how consumers purchasing a ticket in the secondary market prior to the printed date of the 
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tickets will ease the enforcement costs for the FTC, as, barring fraud, it will 
be immediately apparent the route the tickets have taken through the 
market. This information will better protect consumers and deter the 
dubious business practices that currently run rampant throughout the 
ticketing industry. 
To ensure that consumers are aware of the full price of the tickets they 
purchase, the BOSS ACT will also require that primary sellers list the final 
face value of the ticket, including all ancillary charges, on both the ticket 
itself and in any advertising or marketing.193 This provision serves to 
protect consumers from being deceived with regard to the ticket price, as 
many purchasers do not factor in or notice the ancillary charges—which can 
reach up to 50%—that primary ticket sellers add on as convenience or 
service fees.194 Additionally, this will allow secondary purchasers to 
understand the true cost of the ticket and to accurately compare the prices 
offered between the primary and secondary ticket sellers.195 The 
requirement that the face value of the ticket, including ancillary charges, not 
only be on the ticket, but in all advertising and listings as well, will ensure 
that consumers are not “accidently” charged more than they expect when 
they complete their transactions. 
The BOSS ACT will change the refund policy of many primary sellers 
by requiring that they “include all ancillary charges in any refund of a 
ticket” that is subject to a refund.196 Most refund policies currently offer to 
refund the base ticket price plus some of the ancillary charges.197 However, 
this regulation will broadly define ancillary charges to include charges 
associated with a ticket “not included in the base price.”198 While it may be 
argued that a delivery fee is a charge associated with the purchase of a 
                                                                                                                 
primary sale will be better equipped to expose any improper diversions by primary sellers to 
secondary sellers). 
 193. H.R. 2669 § 2(4). The bill requires that: 
[T]he primary ticket seller include, with any listing of the price of a ticket on the 
primary ticket seller’s website or in any promotional material where the ticket price is 
listed, all ancillary charges related to the purchase of a ticket, and include such charges 
and the total cost to the consumer on each individual ticket. 
Id. 
 194. Don Oldenburg, The Ticketmaster Fee-nomenon, WASH. POST, June 29, 2004, at C10. 
 195. See Kirkman, supra note 23, at 746 (announcing the difference between primary and 
secondary prices will shine light on the common practice of “the secondary market dress[ing] up 
as a genuine supply-and-demand-based free market, [and will expose] . . . that the market is 
instead based on bribery”). 
 196. H.R. 2669 § 2(5). 
 197. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Purchase Policy, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/purchase.html? 
tm_link=help_nav_4_purchase (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (noting that Ticketmaster “will issue a 
refund of the ticket's face value paid (or, if a discounted ticket, then instead the discounted ticket 
price paid), all service fees and any convenience charge . . . .” but “[i]n no event will delivery 
charges or any other amounts [including processing fee] be refunded”). 
 198. H.R. 2669 § 6(1). 
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ticket, delivery fees are explicitly exempted from many primary ticket seller 
refund policies.199 The Act will require that primary ticket sellers change 
their refund policies, affording consumers a refund of the full amount they 
spend on tickets, rather than just the portion of the ticket price the primary 
ticket seller is willing to return. 
B. RULES FOR SECONDARY TICKET SELLERS 
The BOSS ACT mandates that the FTC adopt regulations affecting the 
secondary ticket market to protect consumers and eliminate the deceptive 
practices that currently exist.200 When secondary ticket sellers do not have 
possession of the ticket at the time of the sale, the Act requires such sellers 
to clearly state they do not currently possess the ticket, and outline the 
procedure for a refund if the ticket received does match what was 
advertised.201 Next, the Act prohibits the purchase of tickets by secondary 
ticket sellers in the primary market during the first forty-eight hours of the 
sale.202 The legislation also requires secondary ticket sellers to disclose “the 
distribution method and face value of each ticket,” the seat location, the 
date and time of purchase if acquired through primary sale, and “the 
number or identifier assigned to them.”203 Furthermore, the BOSS ACT 
requires that online resale marketplaces clearly post on their Web sites a 
disclaimer that they are secondary ticket sellers and users must confirm 
seeing the disclaimer.204 The Act also prohibits employees of any entity 
involved with the sale of primary tickets to resell tickets for higher than 
face value or to resell them to any person who the employees know or 
should reasonably know intends to sell the ticket for more than face 
value.205 Finally, online resale marketplaces are required to disclose when 
the seller is the “primary ticket seller, venue, or artist associated with the 
event to which the ticket relates.”206 
The BOSS ACT requires full disclosure of secondary ticket sellers 
when they do not possess a ticket at the time of the ticket resale and the 
procedures by which purchasers may obtain a refund if the tickets they 
receive do not match what was advertised.207 Initially, such disclosure will 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Purchase Policy, supra note 197. 
 200. See H.R. 2669 § 3. 
 201. Id. § 3(1). 
 202. Id. § 3(2). 
 203. Id. § 3(3). 
 204. Id. § 3(4). 
 205. Id. § 3(5). 
 206. Id. § 3(6). 
 207. Id. § 3(1). The bill states the following: 
A requirement that if the secondary ticket seller does not possess the ticket at the time 
of the sale that such secondary ticket seller provide— 
(A) a clear statement that the secondary ticket seller does not possess the 
ticket; and  
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make consumers more aware of the potential risks associated with 
transacting business with a particular secondary ticket seller.208 This allows 
consumers to weigh the risks and gives them the information they need to 
decide to purchase their tickets from a party who actually has them in hand. 
Additionally, the overall risk of dealing with these secondary ticket sellers 
will be reduced because, in the event there is a ticket discrepancy, the 
refund policy will have been disclosed. Thus, the disclosure of this 
information to the public will help to give fans a better chance of obtaining 
tickets to their favorite performances and events by increasing their 
knowledge of the ticket resale situation and lessen the risks associated with 
dealing with secondary ticket sellers.209 
The Act will prohibit a secondary ticket seller from purchasing tickets 
in the primary ticket market within forty-eight hours of the primary ticket 
sale.210 This provision will both limit the initial stock of tickets that brokers 
have available for resale and maximize the number of tickets that are 
available for primary sale to eager fans. It will limit the use of automated 
and computerized programs that secondary ticket sellers employ to beat the 
security mechanisms in place on ticket Web sites that are designed to 
prevent the sale of large blocks of tickets at once.211 Furthermore, the 
prohibition will lessen the bait-and-switch practice employed throughout 
the industry during the first forty-eight hours of a primary sale—at least 
with respect to in-hand ticket transactions—as secondary ticket sellers will 
be unable to instantaneously offer tickets to sold-out events and 
performances.212 Accordingly, the ultimate goal of this legislation will be 
                                                                                                                 
(B) an explanation of procedures to be followed by the purchaser to obtain a 
refund from the secondary ticket seller if the ticket the purchaser ultimately 
receives does not match the description of the ticket by the secondary ticket 
seller. 
Id. 
 208. See Hood, supra note 7 (discussing the future prevention of predatory practices that were 
orchestrated by Ticketmaster during the Bruce Springsteen primary ticket offering). Some of the 
warnings may include a disclaimer that the tickets received may be different than what is 
advertised or what they purchased, the seller may be unable to deliver on the sale if the seller’s 
ticket source does not come through, or these tickets might not exist at all. See id. For example, 
this could have possibly prevented TicketsNow’s practice of overselling the Bruce Springsteen 
show when they sold tickets that did not exist to over 300 consumers. See id. 
 209. Press Release, Rep. Pascrell, Jr., Pascrell Unveils “BOSS ACT” to Make Ticket Sales 
Transparent; Reel in Secondary Ticket Market (June 1, 2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/ 
press/nj08_pascrell/pr612009.shtml [hereinafter Pascrell BOSS ACT Press Release]. 
 210. H.R. 2669 § 3(2). An exception exists making this provision inapplicable with respect to 
the sale of “season tickets or bundled series tickets.” Id. 
 211. See Kirkman, supra note 23, at 753–57. The practice of ticket brokers purchasing large 
ticket volumes during primary offerings was the issue at the heart of the lawsuit between 
Ticketmaster and RMG Technologies in 2007. Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 
507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 212. See Hood, supra note 7. 
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achieved by giving the regular fan a better opportunity to purchase 
reasonably priced tickets in the primary market.213 
The BOSS ACT imposes a series of additional disclosure requirements 
on secondary ticket sellers. First, they must disclose “the distribution 
method and face value of each ticket.”214 This combats predatory bait-and-
switch practices by ensuring that purchasers are aware of the primary sale 
face value of the ticket, and are thus informed about the markup they are 
paying for tickets in the secondary market.215 Secondary ticket sellers must 
also make known the seat locations of the tickets they offer for sale.216 This 
disclosure will enable purchasers to accurately assess the worth of the 
tickets, and prevent advertisers from deceptively drawing in consumers 
with claims of “premium” tickets that are actually located in the least 
desirable sections.217 Additionally, if secondary sellers acquired their tickets 
through primary sales, the date and time of the purchases must be 
disclosed.218 This should help combat the illegal practices by which 
secondary sellers acquire their tickets as most tickets are released through 
public sale, and there are only limited legal means by which to get tickets 
through presale events.219 Thus, the failure of a secondary ticket seller to list 
the date and time of purchase could be a sign that illegal conduct is 
occurring. Finally, the Act requires that secondary ticket sellers disclose the 
“number or identifier assigned to them” as part of a system of mandated 
federal registration.220 Collectively, these disclosures will increase the 
available information to the public about ticket resale and about the 
secondary ticket sellers themselves, and provide some protection to 
consumers from deceptive market practices. 
The BOSS ACT requires that online resale marketplaces post a “clear 
and conspicuous notice” on their Web sites that they are secondary ticket 
sellers and requires that the “user confirm having read such notice before 
starting any transaction.”221 This provision was drafted to ensure that 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See Pascrell BOSS ACT Press Release, supra note 209. 
 214. H.R. 2669 § 3(3)(A). 
 215. See, e.g., Young, supra note 106 (purchaser who bought Britney Spears tickets did not 
know the face value of the ticket they purchased for $150 was only $30 until the tickets arrived in 
the mail). See also discussion supra Part II.A. 
 216. H.R. 2669 § 3(3)(B). The bill requires disclosure of the following: 
the precise location of the seat or space to which the ticket would entitle the bearer, or, . 
. . descriptive information about the location of the seat or space, such as a description 
of a section or other area within the venue where the seat or space is located . . . .  
Id. 
 217. See Help—Contact Us—Why Aren’t Seat Numbers Provided?, STUBHUB!, 
http://www.stubhub.com/help/?searchKeyword=top-questions-buyer (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) 
(describing the current policy of StubHub with regards to disclosing seat information). 
 218. H.R. 2669 § 3(3)(C). 
 219. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 36, at 47. 
 220. H.R. 2669 § 3(3)(D). See also discussion infra Part III.C. 
 221. H.R. 2669 § 3(4). 
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consumers are aware of when they are exploring the secondary marketplace 
for tickets.222 It is designed to combat the bait-and-switch practices that led 
to the outcry for regulation of the ticketing industry in February 2009.223 
The regulation will make it more difficult to trick consumers into 
purchasing tickets in the secondary market when under a false belief that 
they are buying from a primary seller. 
The Act also endeavors to combat the illegal procedures by which 
secondary ticket sellers acquire their inventory of tickets. Specifically, it 
prohibits any employee of a group that is involved with the event to resell a 
ticket for more than face value or to resell to any other party who will sell 
the ticket for more than face value.224 This provision serves to eliminate 
illegal payments in two ways. First, it makes it unlawful for someone to 
make a payment of “ice”225 or any money above the face value of a ticket to 
a person involved in the event or performance in some way.226 Second, it 
prohibits the sale of tickets to a person who intends to sell the tickets for a 
profit in the secondary market. This will effectively eliminate the principal 
source of tickets for secondary ticket sellers.227 Accordingly, by making this 
conduct illegal, the BOSS ACT will ensure that tickets are sold in the 
primary market rather than illegally diverted into the secondary market. 
The BOSS ACT also requires that online resale marketplaces disclose 
those instances when the “secondary ticket seller of a ticket is the primary 
ticket seller, venue, or artist associated with the event to which the ticket 
relates.”228 This provision uses disclosure requirements to inform 
consumers when the insiders of a given performance or event are diverting 
tickets away from the primary market and into the secondary market to 
collect higher profits.229 In doing so, the Act both discourages this practice 
                                                                                                                 
 222. See Hood, supra note 7 (unlike during the Springsteen primary ticket offering, where 
consumers had no idea they were transferred to a secondary seller). 
 223. See id. 
 224. H.R. 2669 § 3(5). The bill states the following: 
[a] prohibition on the resale of a ticket by an individual employee of any venue, 
primary ticket seller, artist, online resale marketplace, or box office that is involved in 
hosting, promoting, performing in, or selling tickets if such resale— 
(A) is for a higher price than face value of the ticket; or  
(B) is made to any third party and the employee has actual knowledge, or 
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that the 
third party intends to sell the ticket for a higher price than face value of the 
ticket. 
Id. 
 225. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 226. See Simon, supra note 66, at 1180. 
 227. See id. (since primary ticket sellers will no longer be provided with a bribe, they will no 
longer be willing to favor secondary ticket brokers in selling their allotments). 
 228. H.R. 2669 § 3(6). 
 229. See Smith, supra note 24; see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
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by artists and management,230 and gives consumers the choice whether to 
reward such behavior by purchasing those tickets. This provision, like the 
others, is intended to maximize the number of tickets available for public 
sale in the primary market to provide regular fans with a fair chance to 
attend their desired performances and events.231 
C. REGISTRATION OF SECONDARY TICKET SELLERS AND ONLINE 
RETAIL MARKETPLACES 
In an effort to provide better oversight of the secondary ticketing 
market, the BOSS ACT would require the FTC to implement registration 
requirements for all secondary ticket sellers and online resale 
marketplaces.232 First, this legislation calls for every secondary ticket seller 
and online resale marketplace to register with the FTC.233 The registration 
must include a “viable street address, telephone number, and email address . 
. . ,” and this information must be verified annually.234 Additionally, the 
FTC will assign a unique “identification number or other identifier” to each 
registered secondary ticket seller or online resale marketplace; this 
information must be disclosed upon offering any tickets for sale.235 
Collectively, these requirements will provide greater oversight of the 
secondary market. 
Without this legislation, the secondary ticket market will continue to 
function as a largely unregulated industry. Ticket brokers have attempted 
self-regulation in an effort to appear as reputable businesses236 rather than 
unscrupulous ticket hoarders—an image currently shared by many.237 In 
1994, the National Association of Ticket Brokers (NATB) was formed as a 
voluntary trade organization for ticket brokers.238 Although the NATB 
includes a code of ethics and uniform complaint procedures by which every 
member must abide,239 voluntary membership prevents the organization 
from binding the actions of all secondary market sellers on the national 
                                                                                                                 
 230. See Smith, supra note 24. 
 231. See Pascrell BOSS ACT Press Release, supra note 209. 
 232. H.R. 2669 § 4. 
 233. Id. § 4(a)(1). 
 234. Id. § 4(a)(2)–(3). 
 235. Id. § 4(b). 
 236. See National Association of Ticket Brokers, http://www.natb.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 
2010). 
 237. See generally Daniel McGinn, The Biggest Game in Town: A Single Seat for $35,000? 
How Does This Happen, and Does It Hurt the Fan? Inside the High-stakes, High-stress World of 
Ticket Brokers, BOS. GLOBE SUNDAY MAG., Sept. 21, 2008, at 22. 
 238. National Association of Ticket Brokers, supra note 236. The NATB’s stated mission is “to 
establish an industry-wide standard of conduct and to create ethical rules and procedures to protect 
the public and foster a positive perception of the industry.” Id. 
 239. Id. 
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scale.240 Thus, the BOSS ACT is necessary to require uniform oversight 
over all secondary market sellers, not just those choosing to abide by 
established trade association rules. 
The mandatory registration requirement will allow the FTC to track 
secondary ticket sellers and ensure that they operate in accordance with 
FTC guidelines.241 As it will be unlawful for secondary ticket sellers to 
operate without registering with the FTC, the BOSS ACT will enable 
consumers to assess the reputability of their operations.242 By maintaining 
contact information for secondary ticket sellers on file, the FTC will be 
better able to locate and enforce regulations, rather than wasting resources 
searching for entities that exist solely on the Internet without a fixed 
location.243 Additionally, the existence of “centralized registration” will 
help ensure that secondary ticket sellers can be identified for the payment of 
appropriate taxes.244 Furthermore, requiring secondary ticket sellers to post 
their identification number when engaging in the resale of tickets will 
provide consumers a viable avenue of recourse against those who do not 
transact business according to federal regulations; it will enable consumers 
to file complaints with the FTC or obtain the seller’s contact information 
from the FTC in order to seek private legal remedies.245 The BOSS ACT 
will build upon the mission of the NATB, elevating its optional standards to 
industry-wide requirements by which all secondary ticket sellers and online 
resale marketplaces must abide. 
D. ENFORCEMENT 
The BOSS ACT contains a strong enforcement clause that gives some 
teeth to the substantive regulations and oversight encompassed in the 
legislation. The enforcement provision states that a violation will be treated 
as an unfair or deceptive act and that the FTC will enforce the Act.246 In 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Membership in the NATB is not required for ticket brokers. See id. (listing no mandatory 
requirement that a secondary market ticket seller be a member of NATB). 
 241. See Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 
2009, H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009). 
 242. By requiring that secondary ticket sellers disclose their unique registration number 
assigned by the FTC when offering tickets for sale, the absence of such a registration number will 
signal to consumers that something is not right with this secondary seller. See id. § 3(3)(D). 
 243. See id. § 4(a)(2). 
 244. Daniel J. Glantz, Note, For-Bid Scalping Online?: Anti-Scalping Legislation in an Internet 
Society, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 261, 299–300 (2005). 
 245. See id. at 301 (describing centralized identification as the “necessary reporting and security 
mechanism . . . in place for the collection of taxes [and] private enforcement”). 
 246. H.R. 2669 § 5(a). The bill states the following: 
A violation of a rule prescribed pursuant to section 2 or 3 or a violation of section 
4(a)(1) shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 
U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). The Federal Trade Commission shall enforce this Act in the same 
manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction as though all applicable 
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addition, the Act provides State Attorneys General the power to bring civil 
actions on behalf of the residents of that State for violations of the rules.247 
Furthermore, the FTC, upon receiving appropriate notice of civil action 
brought by a State on matters related to the BOSS ACT, may intervene and 
“be heard on all matters arising in such civil action.”248 Additionally, should 
the FTC file a civil or administrative action, a State may not pursue a civil 
suit until the completion of the FTC’s action.249 Finally, a State may 
“recover reasonable costs and attorney fees from the lender or related party” 
if it prevails in a civil action.250 
An established enforcement mechanism will provide this federal 
legislation with the muscle to effectively regulate the ticketing industry. 
The problem facing voluntary associations and other forms of self-
regulation, such as the NATB, is that there is little effective enforcement, 
besides being removed from the group.251 However, voluntary self-
regulation is often an insufficient deterrent to predatory practices affecting 
an industry.252 The BOSS ACT, conversely, provides strong means to 
enforce its provisions. It allows for enforcement by both the FTC, under its 
general enforcement powers, and the respective State Attorneys General, 
who are charged with protecting the residents of their state.253 The 
opportunity for these groups to seek both injunctive and monetary relief—
in addition to individual consumers’ ability to pursue independent legal 
action254—will effectively enforce the BOSS ACT and ensure appropriate 
compliance throughout the ticketing industry. 
                                                                                                                 
terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were incorporated into and 
made a part of this Act. 
Id. 
 247. Id. § 5(b)(1). 
 248. Id. § 5(b)(3). 
 249. Id. § 5(b)(6). 
 250. Id. § 5(b)(7). 
 251. National Association of Ticket Brokers Code of Ethics, http://www.natb.org/consumer/ 
index.cfm?pg=code.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
 252. Since the NATB is a voluntary organization, and many consumers are probably unaware of 
its existence to begin with, membership in the organization may be of little concern to many po-
tential members, especially those engaging in predatory practices. See Neil Gunningham & Joseph 
Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL. 363, 366–70 (1997) 
(describing self-regulation as “a cynical attempt by self-interested parties to give the appearance 
of regulation (thereby warding off more direct and effective government intervention) while serv-
ing private interests at the expense of the public.”). 
 253. H.R. 2669 §§ 5(a), 5(b). 
 254. Although individuals can pursue remedies under standard state fraud theories, there is no 
private cause of action for violations of the FTC Act. E.g., R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Occ. Saf. & H. 
Rev. Com'n, 708 F.2d 570, 574–75 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1983); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248–
49 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1978); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 
1974); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-
Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). Additionally, at least one circuit has said a state common 
law fraud claim is not supportable by a knowing violation of the FTC Act. Morrison v. Back Yard 
Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATION OF RULES FOR THE FTC TO 
PROMULGATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BOSS ACT 
The BOSS ACT requires that the FTC promulgate rules in accordance 
with the provisions that appear throughout the Act.255 However, it does not 
limit the FTC to only adopting rules in accordance with those provisions. 
Rather, the FTC is free to adopt, as part of its rulemaking authority, more 
exhaustive rules or even include rules that have not been explicitly 
contemplated by the BOSS ACT.256 While the Act seeks to remedy many of 
the problems that exist throughout the ticketing industry, some additional 
regulations should be established to further protect consumers and to better 
regulate the industry. 
The FTC should adopt a rule that protects primary ticket seller Web 
sites from being hacked by professional computer programmers and 
computer software.257 Although the forty-eight-hour prohibition on the 
purchase of tickets in the primary market by ticket brokers may reduce the 
incentive to obtain tickets in this manner,258 the FTC should prohibit the 
conduct explicitly and at all times. Computer programs or other automated 
devices that are designed to circumvent copy protection systems of 
ticketing Web sites and to access many tickets at once—practices which the 
courts have held constitutes copyright infringement and are considered an 
illicit industry practice—will be more directly regulated through such a 
rule.259 Furthermore, the explicit prohibition of this practice will provide 
regulators with more avenues by which to pursue violators, and will 
hopefully make more tickets available to the general public through initial 
public sales. 
The FTC should also require that online resale marketplaces maintain 
records of user activity for at least two years.260 This rule can be modeled 
after New Jersey Statute 56:8:27(d) that requires licensed brokers to 
“maintain[] records of ticket sales, deposits and refunds for a period of not 
less than two years.”261 Such a rule will ensure that if consumer problems 
arise there will be ample records to appropriately resolve the matter. 
Additionally, the FTC could utilize the records during investigations, most 
likely through subpoenas, into alleged illegal sales that may be occurring 
throughout the online resale marketplaces from secondary ticket sellers who 
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 256. Under Section 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006), the FTC 
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are not complying with the FTC regulations.262 This recording requirement 
would further serve to protect consumers in the secondary ticket market and 
facilitate complete compliance with the regulations that govern the ticketing 
industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Recently, it has become clear that the continued operation of the 
primary and secondary ticketing markets as a largely unregulated industry 
is adversely affecting consumers. Because regular fans deserve the 
maximum opportunity to purchase tickets to events at face value in the 
primary market or through controlled means in the secondary market, 
federal legislation is necessary to protect consumers and prevent predatory 
practices from continuing to occur. The BOSS ACT, currently pending in 
Congress, is precisely the type of legislation that is necessary to combat the 
problems that exist throughout the industry to ensure that consumers 
receive the protection they deserve. The Act will effectively maximize the 
number of tickets for public sale to consumers in the primary market, equip 
consumers with more information about the numbers of tickets available 
and from whom they are purchasing tickets, and establish uniform 
procedures for the secondary market. The BOSS ACT will make the 
ticketing industry a more reliable and honest practice and will afford regular 
fans a fair chance to attend their favorite events. 
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